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II

INTRODUCTION

I.

Respondent Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (“EIRMC”) ﬁled
Brief (“Brief”) on September

2020

3,

Dupuis (“Victor”), and Victor submits

As

this

in response to the

this

this

Court

fall

Reply Brief in response

EIRMC’s

thereto.

set forth

within two overarching categories:

a premises liability theory, and,

Respondent’s

Opening Brief ﬁled by Appellant Victor

Court has likely gleaned from the brieﬁng

arguments before

its

duty to Victor under

0n appeal, the varying

EIRMC’S

duty to Victor under

common law

negligence.

Reply Brief addresses EIRMC’S arguments regarding these two overarching issues

This

set forth in its

Brief.

Before addressing the two overarching categories, Victor will ﬁrst respond to

EIRMC’s

contention that 1) Victor raised legal issues for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, and 2) Victor’s request
that this

Court adopt a

new premises

liability

standard for hospital Visitors

is

overbroad, arbitrary,

and unsupported by the record.

II.

1.

ARGUMENT

Victor Did Not Raise Legal Issues for the First

EIRMC
appeal:

A)

argues in

its

Brief that Victor raised the following two issues for the ﬁrst time on

a duty should be imposed

the Court should adopt a

Time 0n Appeal.

0n EIRMC through the Balancing of Harm Analysis, and, B)

new premises

liability

standard for hospital Visitors. Neither of these

items constitute an issue being raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, as argued below.

A. The Balancing of Harm Analvsis

EIRMC
forth in Rife

ﬁrst time

v.

is

Not an Issue Raised

for the First

Time 0n Appeal.

contends that Victor’s citation and reliance 0n the balancing of harm analysis

set

Long, 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143 (1996) constitutes the raising of an issue for the

on appeal.

EIRMC argues because the balancing of harm analysis was not argued before
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the District Court, that

is

it

cannot

now be relied upon in this appeal. Simply put, EIRMC’s argument

incorrect.

This Court recently clariﬁed the longstanding rule that an issue cannot be raised for the
ﬁrst time

0n appeal

in State

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267 (2019). In Gonzalez, this

v.

Court provides a careful analysis between a case in Which a party consistently maintained the same
issue 0r position but “polishes”

(Ada Cnly. Highway

and a case

in

Dist.

v.

its

argument on appeal with

Brooke View,

Inc.

citation to previously uncited authority

162 Idaho 138, 142, 395 P.3d 357, 361 (2017)),

Which a party raises a new substantive issue on Which the

opportunity t0 rule (State

v.

trial

court did not have the

Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 396 P.3d 700 (2017)).

In

its

Court determined that the State did not merely ‘polish’

its

comparison of these two cases, with regard

t0

Brooke View,

this

Court

stated:

Brooke View, the district court addressed the legal issue that ACHD appealed
and ACHD did not change its legal position toward that distinct issue (that
damages caused during construction were not recoverable as part of just
compensation), even though the speciﬁc legal arguments it used t0 support
its position had evolved. This was proper and necessary for ACHD to d0—
during the time of an appeal, parties will ruminate 0n issues and case law Will
be decided that mav need to be applied t0 the speciﬁc facts 0f the case at
However, these pragmatic evolutions do not leave room for a party to
raise new substantive issues 0n appeal or adopt a new position 0n an issue that
the trial court has not had the opportunity t0 rule on.
In

m.

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019)(emphasis added).

As

to Garcia-Rodriguez, this

argument, instead,

it

shifted

prior position (the ofﬁcers

its

had probable cause

t0 believe the

defendant would not appear) t0 the position that the ofﬁcers had probable cause t0 believe the
defendant did not have a driver’s license. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).
This Court summarized

its

analysis of these

two cases

as follows:

Brooke View portrays a party riding on a horse that has been
and reshod for the appellate process, whereas GarciaRodriguez exempliﬁes a party entering the appellate process riding a similarIn other words,

groomed
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looking but entirely
a different horse

is

new

horse.

A groomed horse is expected 0n appeal, but

forbidden.

Id.

As

applied to the case at bar, Victor has merely ‘groomed and reshod his horse for the

appellate process’.

EIRMC

As With

the

assumed a duty of

Judgment, (R. V01.

I,

ACHD

care; this

in

Brooke View, Victor has not changed

was argued

in the Opposition t0

pp. 197-210), argued during the hearing

Judgment, ruled upon by the District Courtl, and,

Opening Brief (Issue #

3:

Did

the District Court

in

Motion

for

Summary

for

Summary

0n EIRMC’S Motion

listed as the third Issue

Err

his position that

Determining

on Appeal

in Victor’s

EIRMC Did Not Assume

a

Duty 0fCare?).
Victor’s citation and reliance

on the balancing 0f harm analysis

in Rife

v.

Long,

albeit

previously uncited authority, constitutes a mere ‘polishing’ of Victor’s consistent position that

EIRMC

assumed a duty of care. Accordingly, the balance 0f harm analysis does not

issue raised for the ﬁrst time

B. Requesting a

0n appeal and so

it

may be

constitute an

considered and relied upon by this Court.

New Premises Liabilitv Standard is Not an Issue Raised for the First

Time 0n Appeal.
Victor argued in his Opening Brief that because this

is

an issue of ﬁrst impression for

this

Court, this Court should issue a ruling that hospital Visitors should be classiﬁed as invitees.
(Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 14).

never requested that the

EIRMC,

district court

in response, states “In the proceedings below,

adopt a

new

arbitrary rule for hospital Visitors based

public policy considerations.” (Respondent’s Brieﬁ p. II).

made this

1

In

its

no

EIRMC

is

upon

correct that Victor never

request to the District Court; the District Court does not have the authority nor ability to

Memorandum Decision and

EIRMC

Dupuis

assumed a

duty.

particular duty t0 Dupuis.” (R. V01.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

--

3

is not a case where
and licensees and assumed

Order, the District Court found “this

EIRMC had existing duties owed t0 invitees
V,

p. 417).

enact such a law,

it is

one

that

must be made by this Court or through the

the issue before the District Court

was not Whether 0r not a new rule should be

always has been, Whether 0r not Victor was an invitee 0r licensee,
care to Victor, and if EIRMC

This

is

and continues

was

liable

under a

enacted,

EIRMC

it

was, and

assumed a duty 0f

theory.

not an issue raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal. Victor’s position has always been,
to be, that

he was an invitee

“Did the District Court Err

in

at

EIRMC the evening of January 24, 2017. The District

On

EIRMC

would be

and Victor’s ﬁrst Issue on Appeal

appeal, Victor argues the District Court erred in ruling

Victor was not an invitee, and in doing so, this Court
invitee While at

p. 419),

determining that Victor was a Licensee Rather than an Invitee?”

(Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. II).

essence,

if

common law negligence

Court ruled that Victor was not an invitee (R. Vol. V,
is

legislature. Additionally,

is

asked to issue a ruling that Victor was an

the evening 0f January 24, 2017. In issuing that ruling, the Court, in

issuing a ruling that

would enact a new precedent

related to the legal status 0f

hospital Visitors within Idaho’s tripartite system.

The
there

is

District

Court stated that

n0 applicable case law

0n appeal,
premises

this

this is a case

to guide the District

Court in

its

decision.

p.

417) meaning,

Because the case

is

now

Court has the opportunity to issue a ruling establishing case law rendering a hospital

liability

case no longer a case of ﬁrst impression.

from making a determination regarding the

2.

0f ﬁrst impression (R. V01. V,

EIRMC’s

such, this Court

an issue raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal,

in opposition t0 this Court adopting the
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not excluded

New Premises Liability Standard.

position that Victor’s request for the adoption of a

to hospital Visitors constitutes

is

legal status 0f hospital Visitors in Idaho.

Victor’s Request t0 the Court t0 Issue a

Despite

As

new

standard.

EIRMC

new

standard related

EIRMC provides brieﬁng

argues a

new

standard wherein

hospital Visitors are classiﬁed as invitees (hereinafter referred t0 as the “Hospital Standard”) should

not be adopted because Victor has not provided sufﬁcient evidence for the adoption 0fthe Hospital
Standard, and Without such evidence, the Court

is

asked t0 make a public policy decision Which

is

better suited for the legislative branch.

A. This Court has the Authoritv t0 Enact the Standard Based on The Existence of a
Compelling Public Policv.

One of EIRMC’S arguments

against this Court adopting the Hospital Standard

is

that

“Victor has failed to present this Court With the type of evidence the Court could reasonably rely

upon

in adopting a

evidence

EIRMC

new

rule with regard t0 hospitals.” (Respondent’s Brie]? p. 24).

contends Victor

is

required t0 present includes:

Evidence establishing that hospital

-

-

Statistical data

The type 0f

Visitors are frequently injured in Idaho;

regarding prevalence of hospital Visitors being injured in Idaho;

and
Evidence supporting what reasonable changes would be necessary to prevent
the type 0f injury in the future.

-

(Respondent’s Brief, p. 24)

T0
Standard,

support

EIRMC

and incorrectly

its

argument

cites to

that this evidence is required for the

Roum‘ree

states that this

v.

Court t0 adopt the Hospital

Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 296 P.3d 373 (2013),

Court declined to adopt the baseball rule “because the plaintiff did

not supply the court with evidence supporting the adoption of the special rule.” (Respondent’s
Brief, p. 24).

The decision by

this

presented t0 the Court; instead,

Court t0 not enact the baseball rule was not for lack 0f evidence

it

was because

this

Court did not ﬁnd that a compelling public

policy for the adoption of the baseball rule existed. Rountree, 154 Idaho 167, 173. Accordingly,
regardless of the evidence

EIRMC
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claims Victor must present, this Court

may

enact the Hospital

Standard based upon
set forth

its

ﬁnding

that a compelling public policy exists to enact such a standard.

As

below, a compelling public policy exists t0 enact this standard.

A Compelling Public Policv Exists t0 Enact a New Premises Liabilitv Standard.

B.

In deciding whether a compelling public policy existed to enact the baseball rule, this Court

compared the baseball

rule With the

ﬁreman’s

rule,

previously enacted by this Court. In Winn

Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 777 P.2d 722 (1989), this Court adopted the ﬁreman’s rule, ﬁnding,

concluded
policy”

that,

was

of the reasons t0 adopt the ﬁreman’s

“the rationale

most appropriate

rule, the fact that

it

v.

“we

was “compelled by public

for our consideration.”” Rowntree, 154 Idaho 167 at

172-73. This Court then stated that the compelling public policy to enact the ﬁreman’s rule

was

in

part, because,

m

The very nature 0f police work and ﬁre ﬁghting is t0 confront danger.
purpose 0f these professions is t0 protect the public. It is this relationship
between police ofﬁcers, ﬁre ﬁghters, and society Which distinguishes safety
ofﬁcers from other employees. Thus, safety ofﬁcers are not “second-class
citizens,” but, rather, are “different” than other

employees.

Rountree, 154 Idaho 167, at 172-73 (citing Winn, 503, 777 P.2d at 725) (emphasis added).

The purpose 0f hospitals and medical professionals
public. This purpose to protect

monetary beneﬁt upon the

A

If,

its

and those persons expect

for instance, Victor

patients

t0 not

Who

fell,

and

I 5)

to those conferring a

and is worth reiterating herein.

Visitors, as that is the place

A hospital should

people g0

when

they are

be ﬁthher hurt While either entering or exiting the hospital.

and Carol were walking

when Victor fell, under EIRMC’S

and care for the

compelling public policy exists as articulated in Victor’s

Opening Brief (Appellant ’s Opening Brief, p.

hurt,

similarly, to protect

and care for the public should not just extend

hospital.

provide the utmost safety to

is

logic, Victor

into the hospital together for Carol’s admission

would not be an

invitee.

However,

if it

were Carol

because she was already experiencing chest pain, she would be considered an invitee.
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The same quandary would apply
and she slipped and

fell

on

ice,

if,

EIRMC

bestowing an economic beneﬁt on
It is

when

Carol was leaving the hospital after being discharged,

would argue

that she is a licensee because she

was not

EIRMC.

a disservice to the general public in the state of Idaho to have such a ﬂuid and narrow

determination 0f the duty they are

owed based

solely

upon

the

economic beneﬁt the hospital

is

receiving.

Based on the forgoing, a compelling public policy

exists that

would enable

this

Court to

adopt a standard such as the Hospital Standard.

C. This Court has the Authoritv to

EIRMC

cites t0

Anstine

Adopt the Hospital Standard.

Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d 677, 679 (1968) as

v.

support that a standard such as the Hospital Standard should be enacted by the legislative branch,
not the court, because

it

was

24-25). However,

it

liability standards

and

relates to the safety

this Court,

and welfare of Idaho

citizens.

(Respondent ’s Briefpp.

not the legislative branch, that enacted the following premises

duties:

Despite the district court’s conclusion that onlv the Legislature could adopt
the Baseball Rule, it is also within this Court’s power to d0 s0. The Court has
established duties 0f care

Stephens

v.

Stearns

we

where none previously

established a

new

existed. For example, in
duty 0f care for landlords — “[A]fter

examining both the common-law rule and the modern trend, we today decide to
leave the common—law rule and its exceptions behind, and we adopt the rule that
a landlord is under a duty t0 exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances.” 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984). We have expanded
duties of care, as in Sharp v. W. H. Moore, Ina, 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d
506, 509 (1990), Where we noted that, While a landlord does not necessarily have
a duty to keep the building doors locked for the safety of the tenant, Where the
landlord and its property manager “initiated a locked door policy and had
employed a security service With the intent of keeping the doors locked, they
undertook such a duty and are subject to liability if they failed to perform that
duty with a reasonable standard of care.” We have also acted to limit an existing
duty, much like Boise Baseball asks us t0 d0 in this case. In Winn v. Frasher,
we adopted the “ﬁreman’s rule,” limiting the duty owed by landowners t0 ﬁre
ﬁghters and police ofﬁcers who are injured on their premises, where such
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caused by the same conduct that required the ofﬁcers’ ofﬁcial
presence 0n the premises. 116 Idaho at 503, 777 P.2d at 725.
injuries are

Rountree

v.

Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 172, 296 P.3d 373, 378 (2013) (emphasis added).

In accordance With

exist, this

its

authority t0 establish a duty 0f care

where one previously did not

Court can enact a standard such as the Hospital Standard Without the legislative branch.

Based on the forgoing, because

it

is

within this Court’s province to enact a standard

establishing hospital Visitors as invitees, and because such standard constitutes a compelling public

policy, Victor

3.

asking this Court issue a decision adopting this standard.

is

EIRMC’s Dutv to Victor Under Premises
Turning

to Victor as

now to

two overarching categories 0n appeal,

an invitee and as a licensee under premises

determination that

EIRMC

the ﬁrst of the

Liabilitv Theorv.

A) Victor was not an

did not breach

its

invitee,

liability.

The

and further erred

EIRMC owed a duty
Court erred in

its

in its determination that

B)

District

duty t0 Victor as a licensee.

A. The District Court Erred in Determining Victor t0 Be a Licensee.
There

is

disagreement between

EIRMC

and Victor as

to the sufﬁciency

Court’s analysis of Victor’s invitee status. Victor, in reliance 0n Packer

2020

Ida.

LEXIS

167, argued in his

Opening Brief

that the District

v.

of the District

Riverbend C0mmuns.,

Court failed t0 articulate

between the two ways someone can be classiﬁed as an invitee (entering upon the premises of
another for a purpose connected With the business conducted on the land,

or,

Where the

Visit

confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible beneﬁt to the landowner).

may

EIRMC

contends the District Court was fully aware 0fthe two ways someone can be classiﬁed as an invitee

and points

to the

Memorandum Decision and Order
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(“Order”) wherein the District Court stated,

not persuaded by Dupuis’ argument that by Visiting his wife, it could
reasonably be said he was conferring a business, commercial, monetary, or other

This Court

is

tangible beneﬁt t0

with EIRMC’S

EIRMC or that he personally was there for a purpose connected

business.

Respondent’s Brieﬁ p. 20, citing R. V01. V,

The

District

418.

Court does not address What

be in determining that Victor was not

EIRMC

p.

at

EIRMC

it

deemed the ‘purpose 0f EIRMC’S

for a purpose connected with

business’ t0

EIRMC’S business.

attempts to shape the District Court’s Order into one that addresses the purpose of

EIRMC’S business by citing to Idaho Code
(Respondent’s Brie]? p. 21).

EIRMC

§

39-1301(a)(1) for the deﬁnition 0f a licensed hospital.

argues that the record and the arguments before the court, in

consideration With I.C. § 39-1301(a)(1), enabled the District Court t0 correctly determine that

Victor was not 0n

EIRMC’S premises

for a purpose connected With

the District Court did not cite to I.C. § 39-1301 nor did

Victor’s Visit

was not

for a purpose connected With

EIRMC’S

Despite

it

proffer any basis for

EIRMC’S

at

EIRMC

B.

The

for a purpose connected With

District

why

it

determined

business.

attempt t0 reﬁne the District Court’s Order, the fact remains that the

District Court did not address nor consider that Victor could

being

EIRMC’S business. However,

Court Erred

EIRMC’S

in Finding

be classiﬁed as an invitee based upon

business.

EIRMC

Did Not Breach

Its

Dutv Owed

t0

Victor as a Licensee.

Even ifthis Court agrees with the District Court’s determination that Victor was
the issue 0f EIRMC’S breach of

in determining

jury.

The

parking

made

EIRMC

its

lot,

and

ii)

duty t0 Victor as a licensee remains. The District Court erred

did not breach

District Court speciﬁcally

its

duty because such determination should be

made ﬁndings

the duty of reasonable care

in error.
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a licensee,

as t0

i)

made by the

EIRMC’S knowledge 0f the dangerous

owed by EIRMC

to Victor,

and such ﬁndings were

i.

The

EIRMC’S Knowledge 0f the Dangerous Condition is a Question for the Jurv.

condition in the parking lot

was unknown

knowledge 0f the dangerous condition.”
that Victor

this action “if the

Court found that Victor could only recover in

District

knew 0f the dangerous

(R. Vol.

V,

and

EIRMC
The

p. 420).

condition and that

knowledge 0f the dangerous condition.
question 0f fact that

to Dupuis,

EIRMC

dangerous

had a greater 0r superior

District Court

made

a ﬁnding

did not have greater 0r superior

A dispute as t0 knowledge 0f the dangerous condition is a

may preclude summary judgment. Shea

v.

Kevic Corp, 156 Idaho 540, 549,

328 P.3d 520, 529 (2014). In Victor’s case, the District Court erred in ruling 0n summary judgment
because

EIRMC’S knowledge of the dangerous

In

its

EIRMC

Brief,

was

in dispute.

argues:

[i]n this case, the District

reasonably

condition 0f the parking lot

Court had n0 evidence before

ﬁnd that EIRMC had

it

upon which

it

could

a knowledge 0f the condition 0f its parking lot on

the evening of January 24, 2017, that

was superior to Dupuis’

actual

knowledge

as

supported by the record.
(Respondent’s Brief, p. 31).

However, there was ample evidence before the
knowledge. Victor relied 0n prior
that

EIRMC had knowledge

Victor

it

is

slip

and

fall

cases on ice at

of the dangerous condition.

misguided because the

slip

and

fall

lots.

evidence of

fall

Court to establish a dispute in

EIRMC premises

EIRMC has

EIRMC

for the contention

argued that such reliance by

incidents did not occur in

cannot be inferred that those incidents gave

parking

District

EIRMC’s

parking

lot

and

any knowledge of the condition 0f the

(Respondent ’s Brieﬁ p. 30). IfEIRMC’s argument that prior incidents do not establish

EIRMC’S knowledge

is

taken to be the appropriate standard, then Victor’s

slip

and

would be considered an isolated incident, and a landowner’s requisite knowledge 0f an isolated

incident

is set

forth

by

this

Court in

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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its

recent decision issued October 5, 2020:

Depending upon the circumstances of the condition causing the injury, plaintiffs
have a few methods by Which they may satisfy their prima facie burden. If the
dangerous condition

an “isolated occurrence,”

temporary or transient, a
plaintiff must prove that the land possessor knew, or should have known, 0f the
speciﬁc dangerous condition that caused the injury. Citing Tommerup, 101 Idaho
is

e.g.,

607 P,2d at 1057; Johnson, 164 Idaho at 57, 423 P.3d at 1009. Of note,
constructive notice — knowledge 0f a condition that the exercise 0f reasonable
at 3,

care would have revealed-is sufﬁcient. All

v.

Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho

479, 481, 708 P.2d 884, 886 (1985).

Oswald

v.

Costco Wholesale Corporation,

_

Idaho

_, _,

_

P.3d

_,

_

(ISC Docket

N0. 47261 emphasis added).
;

EIRMC did not exercise reasonable care in inspecting its parking lot the evening 0f January
24, 2017; a responsibility 0f the Plant Operations Department

parking

lot after

B&K

the

left

EIRMC

premises, (R. Vol.

department checked the conditions of the parking
inspected the parking

have called

lot, it

may have found that

lot that

was
I,

to

check the conditions 0f the

p. 200),

evening. (R. V01.

and n0 one from
I,

p. 200).

this

Had EIRMC

the parking lot contained black ice, and

it

could

B&K t0 come back and treat the ice.

If Victor’s slip

and

of the dangerous parking

fall is

not

deemed t0 be an

lot conditions

isolated incident, then

may be shown through EIRMC’s

EIRMC’S knowledge

operating methods. This

Court recently provided the following synopsis of Idaho cases regarding a landowners’ knowledge,

However,

if

circumstances allow, a plaintiff

may

possessor’s knowledge 0f the dangerous condition

seek t0 prove the land

by showing

that the land

(i.e., how they run their business 0n a daily
dangerous conditions are continuous 0r easily

possessor’s “operating methods”
basis)

were “such

that

foreseeable.”

Oswald

v.

Costco Wholesale Corporation,

No. 47261)(citing All

v.

Smith

’s

_

Idaho

_, _,

its

parking

lots
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Mgmt. Corp, 109 Idaho 479, 481, 708 P.2d 884, 886

The nature 0f EIRMC’s operating methods were
melt applied t0

P.3d

and
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it

instructed

that

it

(1985)).

chose to reduce the amount 0f ice

B&K to not provide pre-treatment services t0 the

parking

lots.

A jury

could ﬁnd that

EIRMC’S

dangerous condition. Victor’s use 0f the prior
that Victor’s slip

to a jury to

and

weigh

all

Evidence of the prior
as recently cited

by

was not an

fall

and

fall

slip

and

fall

isolated occurrence,

inferences regarding

slip

operating methods created an easily foreseeable
cases 0n the

EIRMC

premises show

and those incidents should be presented

EIRMC’S knowledge 0f

the dangerous condition.

cases creates an inference best determined

by

the jury. Again,

this Court,

However, we ﬁnd

difﬁcult t0 adopt a rule of law that

it

would allow a

business to escape liability for a plaintiff s injuries sustained from an errant
vehicle based 0n lack 0f foreseeability

When

the business

0n prior occasions. See Howe, 570 A.2d

similar incidents

fact is that the jury is the appropriate arbiter for resolving

than having the

trial

v.

1203....The

such issues rather

court rule such incidents unforeseeable as a matter of

law.

Oswald

had had three
at

Costco Wholesale Corporation,

_

Idaho

_, _,

P.3d

_,

_

(ISC Docket

N0. 47261).

Based 0n Idaho’s
as

clear case

EIRMC’S knowledge and

law regarding the jury as a

foreseeability, the District

EIRMC’S knowledge of the dangerous
ii.

Demand

to exercise reasonable care. This

in

its

care

recent decision in

was

Oswald

is

ﬁnder for disputed issues such

Court erred in making a ﬁnding as to

condition of the parking

The Dutv of Reasonable Care

Victor’s Complaint and

fact

lot.

a Question for the Jurv.

for Jury Trial against

EIRMC

implicates

EIRMC’S

Court provided a thorough analysis 0f the duty of reasonable care
v.

Costco wherein existing Idaho law 0n the duty 0f reasonable

reiterated as follows:

This Court’s case law

is

clear that

standard, the foreseeability 0f the

when an

harm

is

ordinary duty 0f reasonable care

is

the

a question of fact for the jury. See Sharp

WH. Moore, Ina, 118 Idaho 297, 301, 796 P.2d 506, 510 (1990). Even in the
dangerous-condition context, the reasonable foreseeabilitv 0f the harm is used

v.

as a surrogate for proving

knowledge which,

if

disputed,

is

question for the

jury. See Shea, 156 Idaho at 549, 328 P.3d at 529 (holding that the issue of

knowledge

is

a question of fact that can preclude
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summary judgment).

Oswald

v.

Costco Wholesale Corporation,

_

Idaho

_, _,

P.3d

_,

_

(ISC Docket

N0. 47261) (emphasis added).

When

the facts of a particular case are so out of the ordinary, the question

is

not

owed, but whether the circumstances were
so unforeseeable that the Court can take the question awav from the iurv
because n0 reasonable iuror could determine that the defendant breached its
dutv bv failing t0 take adequate care given how unforeseeable the harm was.
I.R.C.P. 56. This standard ensures that the jury addresses the core questions 0f
Whether the defendant’s actions were reasonable in cases Where reasonable minds
could differ. In such cases, the reasonableness of the conduct is assessed by the
collective barometer 0f the common sense and combined human experience of
multiple jurors, rather than one judge.
whether the

Oswald

v.

facts obviated the duty

Costco Wholesale Corporation,

_

Idaho

_

_, _,

P.3d

_,

_

(ISC Docket

N0. 47261)(emphasis added).

EIRMC’S breach of its duty 0f reasonable
in this matter, as such, the District

judgment, ﬁnding that

4.

EIRMC

care

is

one which should be resolved by the jury

Court erred in granting

did not breach

its

duty

owed to

EIRMC’S motion

for

summary

Victor.

EIRMC’S Dutv to Victor Under Common Law Negligence
The second 0f the two overarching

under

common law

does not apply to

0f care because

it

negligence.

The

District

this case. In its Brief,

already

owed

categories

is

the duty

Court erred in ﬁnding that

EIRMC

contends

that,

A)

is

is

EIRMC owed to Victor

common law

EIRMC

a duty t0 Victor as a licensee, and B)

duty of care based upon an undertaking. Each

A. Assumption of a Dutv

0n appeal

negligence

did not assume a duty

EIRMC

did not assume a

addressed in turn, below.

Not Mutuallv Exclusive from a Dutv Owed under Premises

Liability.

EIRMC
EIRMC,

as the

claims “Victor failed to recognize there

owner 0f

its

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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its

premises for the beneﬁt of

its

licensees.” (Respondent’s Brie]? p. 12).

that

because

it

already

owed

Without providing legal authority, EIRMC’s position

a duty under premises liability law that

it

is

cannot assume a separate

duty 0f care. However, these duties are not mutually exclusive, and, in cases Where a duty does

may

not yet exist, this Court
In Boots

establish a duty of care.

Winters, because a duty 0f care did not already exist, the Idaho Court

v.

determined Whether a duty existed based upon the facts presented to the Court. Boots
145 Idaho 389, 394, 179 P.3d 352, 357 (Ct. App. 2008). The Court ruled

Premises

liability is

involved.

Instead,

care

owed

oprpeals
v.

that:

not the exclusive source of duties where a landowner

circumstances

t0 third parties.

As

mav

give

rise

t0

a

Winters,

is

general dutv 0f

a general principle, every person, in the conduct 0f

his 0r her business, has a duty t0 exercise ordinary care t0 prevent unreasonable,

foreseeable risks of harm to others.

Boots

v.

Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 391, 179 P.3d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added).

EIRMC

Victor’s recovery against

instead,

common law negligence

is

not limited solely to premises liability theories,

also applies as

EIRMC,

in the conduct

of it business, has a duty

t0 exercise ordinary care t0 prevent unreasonable foreseeable risks t0 others,

B.

EIRMC Assumed a DutV 0f Care Based 0n an Undertaking.
Both Victor and

two circumstances
relationship or an

in

EIRMC

cited in their respective appellate briefs, “Idaho

which a person has an afﬁrmative duty of care

assumed duty based 0n an undertaking.” Beers

Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day
is

such as Victor.

no dispute

Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 686,

that a special relationship does not exist

however, a dispute that

Opening Brief (p.

EIRMC

--

to another; a special

Corp. 0f the President 0fthe

316 P.3d 92, 98, (2013). There

between Victor and EIRMC, there

assumed a duty based upon an undertaking. As

21), the current

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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t0

law recognizes

is

cited in Victor’s

an assumption 0f duty based upon an undertaking

is:

“If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having

no prior duty to d0 so,
the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner.” Coghlan v. Beta
Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400, 982 P.2d 300, 312 (1999). That duty,
however,

“is limited t0 the

duty actually assumed.” Beers

Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day

v.

Corp. ofPres. 0f

Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 3 16 P.3d 92,

100 (2013) (citation omitted). “[M]erely because a party acts once does not

mean that party is forever duty-bound to act in a similar fashion.” Id. This duty
arises “When [i] one previously has undertaken to perform a primarily safetyrelated service;

Forbush

v.

[ii]

and [iii] it
from failure

service;

is

result

to

others are relying

on the continued performance of the

reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized harm could

perform the undertaking.”

Sagecrest MultiFamily Prop. Owners ’Ass ’n, 162 Idaho 3 17, 326, 396 P.3d 1199, 1208

(2017).

Notably,
the ﬁrst time

Nor

did

EIRMC

did not claim that the Forbush three factor analysis

on appeal even though Victor did not

EIRMC

rely

upon

it

nor argue

it

is

an issue raised for

t0 the District Court.

address 0r even respond t0 Victor’s reliance and use 0f the Forbush three factor

analysis. Instead,

EIRMC attempts to insert another factor into the three-factor analysis by arguing
ERIMC’S

that Victor has t0 “point t0 evidence demonstrating that

undertaking induced Dupuis t0 rely

[sic]

[sic]

performance of the alleged

EIRMC t0 continue t0 perform the action.” (Respondent

’s

Brief p. 12). The current law on assumption of duty based upon an undertaking does not require
evidence 0r proof of inducement. Instead, as cited above, an assumption of duty arises “When

one previously has undertaken t0 perform a primarily safety-related service;

0n the continued performance of the

service;

and

[iii]

it is

[ii]

[i]

others are relying

reasonably foreseeable that legally-

recognized harm could result from failure t0 perform the undertaking.” Forbush, 162 Idaho 3 17,
326.

EIRMC
related services,

assumed a duty of care based upon
i)

entering into an

removal services, and

ii)

Agreement With

its

B&K Professional

assigning employees t0 walk
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undertaking of the following two safety
Services for

EIRMC premises

to

snow and

ice

check for ice 0r snow

that

needed to be removed

removal was needed

after

after

B&K had left the premises,

B&K if additional ice

B&K left for the evening.

Assumption 0f Dutv Based Upon

i.)

and notifying

B&K Agreement.

EIRMC assumed a duty of care t0 all Visitors 0n EIRMC’S premises, regardless ofthe legal
status

0f such

Visitors,

by entering

cites to

Roum‘ree for

into a

snow removal agreement With

B&K

Professional

Services.

EIRMC
liability

standard as

it

its

proposition that this Court cannot enact a

relates t0 hospital Visitors,

Court expanded upon a premises

liability

however, as

this

duty 0f care in Sharp

297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). In Sharp, this Court noted

v.

new premises

Court cited t0 in Rountree,

W. H. Moore, Ina, 118 Idaho

that,

“While a landlord does not

necessarily have a duty t0 keep the building doors locked for the safety of the tenant,

landlord and

its

this

where the

property manager initiated a locked door policy and had employed a security

service with the intent of keeping the doors locked, they undertook such a duty and are subj ect t0

liability if they failed to

Baseball,

perform that duty With a reasonable standard of care.” Rountree

LLC, 154 Idaho

167, 172,

296 P.3d 373, 378 (2013)(citing Sharp

v.

v.

Boise

W.H. Moore, Ina,

118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990)).

EIRMC’s Agreement With

B&K created a duty similar t0 the duty of care expanded upon

in Sharp.

EIRMC may not have necessarily had the duty to keep its premises safe for every Visitor,

but once

it

its

employed

premises

safe,

it

B&K t0 provide ice and snow removal

undertook that duty and

with reasonable standard 0f care.
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of keeping

subject to liability for failing to perform such duty

changing the terms 0f the Agreement to reduce the amount

0f ice melt and eliminate use of parking

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

is

services, With the intent

lot

pretreatment for cost savings (R. V01.

I,

p. 200),

EIRMC

did not perform

report (R. V01.

II,

its

duty with a reasonable standard 0f care. Roland “Bud” York’s expert

pp. 250-264) and (R. V01. IV, pp. 405-413) provided his expert opinion directly

EIRMC

addressing the reasonableness of

reducing snow and ice removal services.

As argued

below, the District Court improperly issued a ruling on summary judgment without ﬁrst ruling 0n

EIRMC’S Motion to

EIRMC

Strike.

assumed a

B&K and thereby

it

safety related duty to all Visitors

undertook the responsibility of ensuring

by entering
its

parking

Agreement with

into the

lots

and sidewalks are safe

t0 traverse.

ii.)

Assumption of Dutv Through Employee’s Actions.

As with EIRMC
expanded upon

in

contracting with

Sharp also applies

t0

B&K

EIRMC’S

for

snow removal

responsibilities

services, the duty

of care

under the Agreement.

EIRMC

established the practice of 1) directing employees from Plant Operations at

status

spot

of EIRMC’s parking

is

lot

and sidewalks

after

B&K had left the premises,

found or additional snow removal services are needed

EIRMC was

responsible to contact

EIRMC

B&K has

after

B&K t0 return to the premises

(R. V01.

I,

Operations t0 check the conditions parking
and, once

it

it

began contacting

undertook such a duty.

failing t0

t0 the

By

lot

and sidewalks

after

left

the premises,

it

EIRMC

did

instructed Plant

B&K left EIRMC premises,

B&K t0 return t0 the premises if additional slick spots were found,
undertaking these duties of care,

EIRMC

perform such duty With reasonable standard of care. There

evening of January 24, 2017 (the date Victor

conditions of the parking lot (R. Vol.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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I,

p. 200), and,

fell),

is

is

subject to liability for

n0 dispute

that with regard

Plant Operations did not check the

EIRMC

did not contact

B&K t0 return t0

EIRMC

for

any

slick spots

it

found. (R. Vol.

I,

p. 200).

These inactions by

EIRMC

do not comply

With the requisite reasonable standard of care duty.
Lastly,

and

in

summation of the forgoing

an undertaking for safety related services.
the

section,

EIRMC

EIRMC premises, regardless 0ftheir status as

EIRMC

assumed these

EIRMC

undertaking, and such duty of care exists despite

under premises

5.

The

a_ll

Visitors to

is felt

by

a_ll

failure t0

Visitors to the

EIRMC

assumed a duty 0f care based upon an

EIRMC’S

duty

owed

to invitees

and licensees

liability.

District

EIRMC

duties of care to

an invitee or licensee. Thus, EIRMC’S

carry out these duties With a reasonable standard 0f care

premises, not just those with an invites status.

assumed a duty of care through

Court Erred

in Failing to

Consider the Expert Report of Bud York.

does not argue nor respond t0 Victor’s contention that the District Court must

resolve credibility issues before ruling 0n a
recited the court’s

summary judgment

ﬁnding

that the opinions

summary judgment motion.

Instead,

EIRMC

only

0f Roland “Bud” York were moot because 0f the

decision. (Respondent’s Brieﬁ p. 32). This

is

the incorrect standard,

EIRMC

does not argue otherwise.

When considering

evidence submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment,

a court can only consider material which would be admissible at

Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007).

As

a result, the court

trial.

Gem

State Ins. C0.

must determine objections

v.

t0

the admissibility 0f evidence as a “threshold question” before addressing the merits ofmotions for

summary judgment. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho
admissibility 0f evidence

is

raised

1, 6,

by objection by one 0f the

205 P.3d 650, 655 (2009). Ifthe

parties, the court

must ﬁrst make a

threshold determination as to the admissibility of the evidence before reaching the merits 0f the
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summary judgment motion. Gem
v.

Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 81

State Ins. C0., 145 Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176 (citing

979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).

1,

The District Court erred by not resolving

credibility issues 0r determining the admissibility

0f Mr. York’s expert report before determining
judgment.

decision on

EIRMC’S motion
fact

for

summary

which would have

summary judgment. As described above

in Section

Mr. York speciﬁcally addresses the unreasonableness in EIRMC’S reduction of ice melt

and elimination of parking

pretreatment application. Such opinion has bearing 0n the outcome

lot

0f a motion for summary judgment, and thus,

Motion

its

Mr. York’s expert report created genuine issues of material

precluded the granting of EIRMC’s motion for

4(B)(i),

Bromley

to Strike as

‘moot’ because

it

it

was

error for the District Court t0 determine the

had already granted EIRMC’s motion for summary

judgment.

III.

Based 0n the forgoing brieﬁng

CONCLUSION

as well as Appellant’s

requests this Court to reverse the District Court’s

Opening

Brief, Victor respectfully

Memorandum Decision and Order and to reverse

the District Court’s Judgment.

DATED:

October

8,

2020.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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